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IL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants Charles and Janice Lepper appeal the District Court's order excluding the

testimony of plaintiffs' expert witnesses and the resulting summary judgment entered in favor of
defendants Eastern Idaho Health Service, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center
(hereinafter "EIRMC") and Dr. Stephen R. Marano, (hereinafter "Dr. Marano") in a medical
malpractice case in which Charles Lepper has alleged that the negligence of the defendants rendered
him a paraplegic. R. at 16.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Charles and Janice Lepper filed there complaint against EIRMC on June 17, 2011. R. at 16.

An Amended Complaint was filed on October 26, 2012 adding Dr. Marano as a co-defendant. R. at
33. On January 18, 2013 the District Court entered its Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial. R. at 89.
By Stipulation, the parties agreed to modify and extend the expert witness and discovery disclosure
deadlines from those originally found in the court's Order. R. at 93A. The Stipulation was reduced
to court Order. R. at 93.
According to the amended Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, plaintiffs' expert witnesses
were to be disclosed by October 30, 2014. R. at 93B. In compliance therewith, plaintiffs filed their
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses on October 30, 2014, disclosing the opinions and conclusions of
Bradford W. DeLong, M.D. and Elizabeth Arruda, RN, BSN, CMSRN. R. at 159. Thereafter,
defendants EIRMC and Dr. Marano sought and obtained an order in limine striking plaintiffs' expert
witnesses for plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with the Court's Pre-Trial Order regarding expert
opinion disclosures. R. at 168A, 168UUUUUUUUUU.
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Beginning with the court's Order on defendant's respective motions in limine, there has been
a number of "yo-yo" decisions from the District Court relating to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses.
These decisions and the salient events leading to the appeal from the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants are as follows:
1. The Court initially disqualified plaintiffs' experts but then, upon plaintiffs' motion for
an extension of time, allowed plaintiffs 14 additional days (until December 19, 2013) to
supplement and cure the deficiencies perceived by the Court in the disclosures. 1 R. 188191; 204-207.

2. Plaintiffs timely supplemented their expert disclosures on December 18, 2013, and filed
affidavits and documents demonstrating both Arruda's and DeLong's qualifications to
testify at trial. 2 R. 224-271.
3. The day after plaintiffs supplemented their disclosures, defendant EIRMC moved for
reconsideration of the Court's order by which plaintiffs were allowed additional time to
supplement. R. at 617-619. This motion was granted by Order dated January 14, 2014,
and plaintiffs' experts (Arruda and DeLong) were again disqualified from testifying:
again upon the pretense that their testimony was "irrelevant." R. 767-771.
4. The Court's January 14, 2014 order granting Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
and excluding plaintiffs' experts indicated that:
To the extent Defendants believe this ruling is dispositive of
the case, they may file a motion for summary judgment. The
motion may be based on the record without the need for a
hearing3. R. at 770.

1Plaintiffs

had filed both a motion to extend time for disclosures and a motion for reconsideration.
Reconsideration was summarily denied, but the motion to extend time was granted.
2This included Arruda's December 2013 disclosure verifying her consultation with a local nurse, Susan Dicus.
Plaintiffs were unable to obtain the cooperation of any neurosurgeon in the relevant "community" to consult with
DeLong, and the efforts to obtain consultation from other Idaho neurosurgeons failed. This was documented by the
December 18, 2013 affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel, Lance Nalder, and the exhibits thereto. See R. 275-597.DeLong's
December 2013 supplemental disclosure also documented his familiarity with the standard ofcare in a similar community
through consultation with a neurosurgeon in Billings, Montana (John Schneider, Jr.). Dr. Schneider also filed an affidavit
in support of the plaintiffs' claim. See R. 224-245; 246-271.

3

At the time of the court's Order granting EIRMC's Motion for Reconsideration, both defendants had filed
Motions to Dismiss. Notwithstanding, the Court invited the defendants to file motions for summary judgment, invoking
the briefing/affidavit rules ofI.R.C.P. 56.
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5. Both Defendants then filed motions for summary judgment, without affidavits and
without supporting memoranda. R. at 775, 778. Plaintiffs filed an objection to the
summary judgment motions and a second Motion for Reconsideration. R. at 781, 785;
789. The court did not hold a hearing on plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration
nor defendants' motions for summary judgment.
6. The Court issued its Order on January 21, 2014 allowing plaintiffs 14 days (to February
4, 2014) to file "all affidavits, briefs, or other documents they wished to file in opposition
to Defendants' motions for summary judgment," and to file "all documents in support
of any motion for reconsideration." R. at 794 [Emphasis added.] The defendants were
allowed 7 days to respond to plaintiffs' filings. R. at 794.
7. On February 3, 2014 the plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit of Nurse Elizabeth
Arruda. In her affidavit, Nurse Arruda outlined her review ofEIRMC's internal policies
and procedures which were disclosed by EIRMC after the October 30, 2013 disclosure
deadline but in response to discovery and which provided Nurse Arruda with an
independent foundation for her opinions. R. at 904-905.
8. Notwithstanding the invitation from the court to file affidavits and documentation in
support oftheir opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment and in support
of their Motion for Reconsideration, the court granted summary judgment and denied
plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. That the court would not consider the affidavits
from plaintiffs' expert witnesses in opposition to summary judgment and/or in support
ofreconsideration as this affidavit testimony (by Dr. DeLong or Nurse Arruda) was filed
subsequent to the initial disclosure deadline of October 30, 2013. The court concluded
that plaintiffs had therefore failed to present the expert testimony needed to present a
primafacie case. R. at 1205, 1208-1209.
Concurrent with entering summary judgment in favor of defendants, the District Court
entered its Judgment pursuant to IRCP 54. R. at 1210. Plaintiffs filed a third Motion to Reconsider
according to IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B) within 14 days of entry of the judgment, which was also summarily
. denied by the Court and without hearing on the reasoning that Rule 11 was inapplicable to a final
judgment4 • R. at 1268, 1302. This appeal followed.

4

Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the Order on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and
interlocutory order, not the fmaljudgment, and within the time allowed by Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). R. at 1268.
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal turns on whether the District Court erred in excluding plaintiffs' expert witnesses

for plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with the court's initial pretrial order requiring disclosure of
the opinions and conclusions of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The Pre-Trial Order did not specify that
the scope of the disclosures required by plaintiffs beyond disclosure of"opinions and conclusions."
The Pre-Trial Order did not state that plaintiffs were to disclose foundational facts for each expert,
and the court refused to consider the expert witness' affidavit testimony in support of plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider. Therefore, the specific facts of the underlying claim are relatively
inconsequential for purposes ofthis appeal. To assist the Court in understanding the nature of this
claim and the allegations made by the plaintiffs, the following is a brief statement of facts:
On August 19,2010, plaintiff Charles Lepper underwent a low back laminectomyand fusion
from L2 through SI, with placement of rods and screws. R. at 654-655; Deposition of Stephen R.

Marano, at pp. 11, 22. The surgery was performed by defendant Stephen Marano, M.D., and was
performed at the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. R. at 654-65 5. Mr. Lepper was discharged
from the hospital post-surgery on September 3, 2010. However, because of hyponatremia Mr.
Lepper was readmitted to EIRMC on September 10, 2010. At the time of his admission on
September 10, 2010 Mr. Lepper was complainingofpainfromhis lumbar fusion surgery. R. at 130.
Prior to Mr. Lepper's surgery, Dr. Marano was aware of the risk ofbleeding and the risk of
possible post-surgery formation of an epidural hematoma in the area of the low back surgical site.
R. at 656; Deposition ofSteven Marano, at p.40. Dr. Marano was aware that an epidural hematoma
could compress the thecal sack and cauda equina nerves, resulting in partial or complete paralysis
due to either restrictive blood flow, compression of the nerves, or a combination of both. R. at 660;
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Deposition ofSteven Marano, at p.57. Dr. Marano was further aware that the most definitive way
to diagnose a post surgical lumbar epidural hematoma that is compressing the cauda equina was
through either a myelogram or an MRI. R. at 660; Deposition of Steven Marano, at p.58.
On September 11,2010, one day after Mr. Lepper was readmitted to EIRMC for dehydration
and hyponatramia, a physician's order was issued directing EIRMC nurses to ask that Dr. Marano
be contacted to see Mr. Lepper. R. at 665-666, 685; Deposition of Steven Marano, at pp. 80-81.
However, no nurse from EIRMC contacted Dr. Marano and asked him to visit Mr. Lepper. R. at
666; Deposition ofSteven Marano, at p.81.
On the evening of September 14, 2010, while Mr. Lepper was still at EIRMC, he developed
severe back pain and bilateral leg numbness. R. at 718; Deposition of Charles Edward Lepper, at
pp. 87-88; R. at 719; Deposition ofJanice Lepper, at p. 83. Neither EIRMC' s nurses nor Dr. Marrano
took appropriate steps upon becoming aware of Charles Lepper's changing neurological status on
September 14, 2010 to evaluate, treat, or care for Charles Lepper.
On September 15, 2010 another EIRMC nurse took over Mr. Lepper's nursing care. This
nurse performed an assessment on Mr. Lepper at approximately 8:32 a.m. R. at 731; Deposition of

Sandra Markowski, at p.11. At that time, Mr. Lepper was not able to move his legs and was
experiencing acute back and low leg pain from his hips down. R. at 732; Deposition ofMarkowski,
p.13, 11. 4-17. However, this nurse did not communicate Mr. Lepper's status to a doctor. Dr. Marano
testified that "nothing was reported" to him about Mr. Lepper's deteriorating condition until he
"walked in on rounds" at about 10:00 a.m. on the morning of September 15, 2010. R. at 662-663;

Deposition of Steven Marano, at pp.68-69, pp.71-72. Dr. Marano finally ordered a MRI for Mr.
Lepper, (R. 663; Deposition ofSteven Marano, at p. 72), which led to the diagnosis that Mr. Lepper
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was suffering from the effects of a compression of the cauda equina as a result of an epidural
hematoma. R. at 664; Deposition ofSteven Marano, at pp. 73-75. Dr. Marano opined that, "after
more than 12 hours of being like that, [Mr. Lepper's] odds were not stacked in his favor" for
complete recovery. R. at 667; Deposition ofSteven Marano, at p.91.
Plaintiff Charles Lepper now suffers from permanent paralysis of his lower extremities and
has bowel and bladder dysfunction to the extent that he requires a suprapubic catheter and a
colostomy bag. R. at 722; Deposition of Janice Lepper, p. 253. Mr. Lepper has had multiple
surgeries for skin ulcers in the area of his coccyx, cannot get in and out of bed or onto or off of a
toilet without assistance, and largely requires assistance for most all activities of daily living and
functions. R. at 720, 721-722; Deposition ofJanice Lepper, at p. 201-203, 252-254.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err by interpreting its Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial as requiring
disclosure by the expert witness disclosure deadline of all of plaintiffs' expert opinions,
including the foundational facts required by Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013?

2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of plaintiffs' experts
Bradford W. DeLong, M.D., and Elizabeth Arruda, RN, BSN, CMSRN, based on the
language of the court's pre-trial Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial?

3.

Did the District Court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Court's prior
decision to exclude plaintiffs' expert witnesses, after the Court had clarified the Court's
expectations with respect the scope of the expert disclosures contemplated by the pre-trial
Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial?
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4.

Did the District Court err in granting defendant EIRMC' s Motion for Reconsideration, which
took away the additional time the Court had initially granted to plaintiffs to cure the Court's
perceived deficiencies in plaintiffs' initial expert witness disclosures, and after plaintiffs had
already timely submitted the additional information necessary to cure such perceived
deficiencies?

5.

Did the District Court err procedurally by inviting the plaintiffs to file any responsive/
opposing briefs, argument and affidavits pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 56(c) in opposition to
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, only to then ignore the affidavits plaintiffs had
timely filed and enter Summary Judgment?

6.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment in favor of defendants while
ignoring the affidavit and declaration testimony of plaintiffs' expert witnesses produced in
opposition to the defendants' respective motions for Summary Judgment?

7.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment in favor ofboth defendants without
a hearing?

8.

Did the District Court err by failing to consider the opinions of expert witness Elizabeth
Arruda in opposition to Summary Judgment, which opinions were based on defendant
EIRMC's own internal policies and procedures disclosed bu EIRMC in the course of
discovery after the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure deadline had passed but before the
discovery cutoff deadline specified by the Court in its pre-trial Order?

9.

Did the District Court err by summarily and without a hearing denying plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider filed fourteen (14) days after issuance of the court's decision on defendant's
respective Motions for Summary Judgment, as being untimely?
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10.

Did the District Court err in failing to consider the expert affidavits and declaration
testimony submitted by plaintiffs in support of their third Motion to Reconsider filed on
February 28, 2014, when the Court denied plaintiffs' third Motion to Reconsider without a
hearing?
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a district court's decision of summary judgment, this Court employs the
same standard as that properly employed by the trial court when originally ruling on the motion.
Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 249, 46 P.3d 1105, 1007 (2002), citing Thomson v. Idaho Ins.
Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,529,887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). Summary judgment is proper "if the

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw." Id. Citing Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c).
If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inference from

the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128
Idaho 714, 718 (1996), citing Harris v. Departmento/Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 195,198 (1992).
"It is axiomatic that on summary judgment the Court views all facts and inferences from the

record in favor of the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the absence
of genuine issues of material fact." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,210, 868 P.2d 1224, 1226
(1994). "These same standards apply to motions for summary judgment in medical malpractice
cases". Id. Citing Pearsons v Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 338, 757 P.2d 197,201 (1988).
To avoid summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a medical negligence/malpractice
case, there is an additional requirement that the plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that
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the defendant health care provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care
practice. See Idaho Code§§ 6-1012, 6-1013.
The admissibility of expert testimony, however, is a threshold matter that is distinct from
whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary
judgment. Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho, 804,291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012), citing Dulaney
v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002).
This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard.
Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,805,291 P.3d 1000, 1004 (2012).
An abuse of discretion review requires a three-part inquiry: (1)
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issues as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standard applicable
to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.

Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 114, 254 P.3d 11, 15 (2011), citing McDaniel v. Inland
Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 856, 858-29 (2007).
V. ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
This appeal turns on 1) whether plaintiffs complied with the court's initial pre-trial order
by which plaintiffs were directed to disclose the "opinions and conclusions" of expert witnesses and,
2) if plaintiffs' initial disclosures were in fact inadequate, whether plaintiffs presented additional
information by affidavits in support of their Motions for Reconsideration to establish the
foundational requirements for their expert witnesses' opinions and testimony. Plaintiffs contend that
the District Court abused its discretion in these areas to dismiss plaintiffs' claims.
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A.

The District Court erred by interpreting its Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial as
requiring disclosure of foundational facts required by Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 61013 by the initial expert witness disclosure date.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial judges discretion in fashioning pretrial orders
to efficiently manage cases. Fish Haven Resort, Inc., v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118,121,822 P.2d 1015,
1018 (Ct. App. 1991). The "pretrial procedure rules have certainly created a more active and
managerial role for the judge in the adjudication process." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 87 5,
136 P.3d 338, 346 (2006). The district court is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial
phase oflitigation. Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364 (9 th Cir. 1985).
The District Court in this matter entered its Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial on January
18, 2013. The language of the pretrial order applicable to the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure
reads, in its entirety:
Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure, including op1mons and
conclusions must be filed at least 100 days before trial.
R. at 89. No other explanation, clarification or directive was provided by the Court in its pre-trial
order regarding the scope of the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures. There was no reference to
LR. C.P. 26 disclosures or to Idaho Code §6-1012 or §6-1013 foundational fact disclosures. When
the parties stipulated to amend the disclosure dates in the pretrial order, the Court's language
concerning the scope of the disclosures did not change. The Stipulation applicable to the plaintiffs'
expert witness disclosure reads, in its entirety:
Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure, including op1mons and
conclusions must be filed or before October 30, 2013.
R. at 93B. Again, there was no directive or reference to Rule 26 or to Idaho Code §6-1012 or §6-
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1013.
Based on the language of the pretrial order, Plaintiffs timely disclosed the substantive
opinions and conclusions of their experts, Nurse Elizabeth Arruda and Dr. Bradford DeLong, within
the prescribed disclosure period. Even though there was no mention of Idaho Code §6-1012 in the
pretrial order, the defendants filed motions in limine to exclude the testimony of experts Arruda and
DeLong arguing that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the pretrial order. The Court heard
defendants' motions on December 3, 2013 and entered its bench order excluding the testimony of
Arruda and DeLong as being "not relevant" because the plaintiffs' duty to disclose included the duty
to disclose "all testimony which would establish the witness' competency to testify." R. at 189,
emphasis in original. In so holding, the Court necessarily interpreted its pretrial order regarding
expert witness disclosures as requiring disclosure of all testimony (as opposed to all opinions and
conclusions) of the experts, to include the foundational facts which would make the opinions and
conclusions admissible at trial, even though such was not a stated requirement in the court's pretrial
order. In this sense, the court interpreted its own order as including such requirements, without
adequately placing plaintiffs and their counsel on notice of this apparently implied but never
articulated standard. The court simply believed that plaintiffs should have anticipated or divined that
the foundational facts relating to familiarity with the local standard of care were to be disclosed
along with the experts' "opinions and conclusions."
Plaintiffs should not have been subjected to sanctions for failure to comply with the District
Court's own subjective interpretation ofthe words "opinions and conclusions" as used in the pretrial
order. It was particularly inappropriate for the District Court to exclude plaintiffs' experts (and
thereby effectively defeat plaintiffs' entire claim) based on an unclear pretrial order susceptible to
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differing interpretations.
1.

The court's pretrial order was vague and ambiguous and the court abused its
discretion in excluding the testimony of plaintiffs' experts based on the pretrial
order.

The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ruled that a failure to disclose foundational
information required under LC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 by a court's expert witness disclosure date,
when not explicitly required by the language of the pretrial order, is not a basis for excluding expert
testimony. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006).
In Edmunds, the plaintiff disclosed supplemental testimony and opinions of a previously

disclosed expert witnesses after the pretrial order deadline had passed. The trial court excluded the
supplemental testimony because it was not disclosed on or before the court's expert witness
disclosure deadline as contained in the pretrial order. The Idaho Supreme Court held that such a
ruling was erroneous because: 1) the court's pretrial order did not require the disclosure of the LC.
§ §6-1012 and 6-1013 foundational basis for the opinions; and 2) Idaho case law specifically
contemplates that expert testimony can change after the initial disclosure. Id.
In summarizing its opinion the Idaho Supreme Court stated:

Here, the trial court's decision essentially added the requirements
ofl.C. §§6-1012 and 6-1013 to his pretrial order, which did not
give the Edmunds notice that they would be held to this
standard in their initial disclosures, and ignored that Idaho law
and rules of civil procedure contemplate that expert opinions can
change and develop during the course of litigation.... While a
court may properly order parties to disclose expert witnesses by a
deadline, a brief order dictating the date of disclosing only the
names of the expert witnesses cannot trump the requirement of
LR.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B) that parties seasonably supplement their
discovery responses as new information is learned or expert
opinions changes.
Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346. [Emphasis added.]
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The District Court's decision to exclude plaintiffs' experts in this matter based on the
pretrial order is similar to the situation in Edmunds. The District Court's decision added the
requirements of LC. § §6-1012 and 6-103 without giving the Leppers notice that they would be held
to such a standard with their expert witness disclosures. The District Court acknowledged this in its
Order on Reconsideration, Extension of Time, Etc. of December 5, 2013. In that Order the court
noted, "Plaintiffs are correct in noting that the scheduling order did not specifically reference the
statutory burden ofproof set out in I.C. § 6-1012 or §6-2013[sic]" and the court agreed that Edmunds
stands for the "proposition that a trial court should allow some latitude for non-compliance with a
scheduling order that does not specifically identify what is to be disclosed." R. at 205 [Emphasis
added].

2.

The District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant plaintiffs' Motion
to Reconsider its initial decision to exclude plaintiffs' expert witnesses after it
clarified its expectations with respect to the disclosures contemplated by the
pretrial order.

As noted above, the District Court conceded that the Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial did
not specifically reference the statutory burden of proof set out in I.C. §6-1012. Atthe same time, the
court stated it was its "opinion that Plaintiffs' disclosure as to Arruda and Delong should have
included information as to their knowledge of the local standard of care or otherwise how their
testimony would be admissible under Idaho law. R. at 205. Despite the fact that Plaintiffs pointed
the court's attention to Edmunds, and that the court had then clarified for the plaintiffs its expectation
with respect to its pretrial order, the Court did not apply the reasoning ofEdmunds to its non-specific
pretrial order and denied plaintiffs motion to reconsider. Such decision was an abuse of discretion.
Despite the court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, the court
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nevertheless extended to plaintiffs the remedy sought by plaintiffs; namely, an extension of time
within which to comply with the court's newly disclosed expectations with respect to the disclosure
of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Unfortunately, this was only a subterfuge, after plaintiffs had fully
relied on the court's extension of time, the court "pulled the rug" out from under the plaintiffs and
rescinded the extension of time provided by the Court's December 5, 2013 order.
Had the court granted the Motion to Reconsider, the plaintiffs could have complied with the
court's newly disclosed expectation with respect to the expert witness disclosures and this case could
have proceeded along a normal litigation path. By failing to grant Plaintiffs' Motion, the court set
in motion the avalanche of pleadings and decisions with respect to a disclosure technicality, rather
than moving the case forward on the merits.

3.

The court abused its discretion by failing to consider lesser sanctions where
plaintiffs were not on notice as to the court's expectations of the scope of the
expert disclosures contemplated by the court and the Court's decision was in
effect a dismissal of plaintiffs' Complaint.

By excluding plaintiffs' expert witnesses, the court effectively imposed a sanction against
plaintiffs which was the equivalent of a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims 5• Such sanction effectively
terminated the case on motion practice without a trial on the merits and without even the benefit of
briefing and argument, which would customarily accompany a summary judgment proceeding. Such
sanction seems extraordinarily harsh in light of the court's acknowledgment that its pretrial order
did not clearly outline the plaintiffs' disclosure requirements and that a brief extension of time would
not unduly prejudice defendants. R. at 205.
Such harsh sanction was not only an abuse of discretion by the District Court, but was also

5 The court essentially acknowledged the decision to exclude plaintiffs' expert witnesses was dispositive of this

case when it invited defendants to file their motions for summary judgment without affidavits or briefing. R. at 770.
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inconsistent with the court's own pretrial order it was seeking to enforce. According to the pretrial
order, the ordet would "control the course of this action unless modified for good cause shown to
prevent manifest injustice." R. at 91. Certainly excluding plaintiffs' expert witnesses from testifying,
the equivalent ofa "death sentence" to a medical malpractice claim, constituted "manifest injustice."
Appellate Courts in Idaho have consistently held that the Court should pursue lesser
sanctions/remedies, and that a sanction which effectuates a dismissal of the cause of action should
be reserved for only the most extreme and egregious conduct. See Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 667668,931 P.2d657, 661-662 (Ct. App. 1996);Adamsv. Reed, 138 Idaho 36, 39, 57P.3d 505,508 (Ct.
App. 2002).
B.

The District Court further erred and compounded the problem it had created by
granting defendant EIRMC's Motion for Reconsideration after plaintiffs had cured
the perceived deficiencies in their expert witness disclosures and submitted
information to the court to demonstrate how the opinions and conclusions would be
admissible.

By clarifying the court's position with respect to the scope of disclosures contemplated by
the Court, the plaintiffs understood exactly what was expected with respect to their expert witness
disclosures. Such confusion was ameliorated and any prejudice minimized when the court extended
a 14 day "window" for plaintiffs to provide the disclosures. R. at 204-207. Despite defendants'
attempts to argue that the phraseology "opinions and conclusions" was sufficient to put plaintiffs on
notice of the need to comply with LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, there is nothing in the court's Order
and Notice Setting Jury Trial which would specify that requirement. At a minimum, the pretrial order
was subject to reasonable and conflicting interpretations. By extending time to the plaintiffs, the
court employed a reasonable use of the court's discretion and granted relief in line and consistent
with the Supreme Court of Idaho's holding in Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338
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(2006). This logic was short lived.
In reliance on the court's time extension, plaintiffs worked diligently to provide the

information requested by the Court. Because the plaintiffs now understood that the court expected
disclosure of I. C. §6-1012 facts and compliance with LR. C.P. 26 by the new deadline, plaintiffs also
understood that a determination had to be made concerning the indeterrninability of the local
standard of practice as it related to Dr. Marano 6.
Unfortunately, after correctly following the guidance in Edmunds v. Kraner, the court simply
reversed its decision by claiming it made "a mistake" and granted defendants' motions
reconsideration of the extension of time. R. at 769. As justification the court referenced the purpose
of a pretrial order. R. at 769. Such decision not only punished plaintiffs for their reasonable reliance,
it also put the plaintiffs back in the same position they were in at the December 3, 2013 and
December 5, 2013 hearings where the judge acknowledged, "Plaintiffs are correct in noting that the
scheduling order did not specifically reference the statutory burden of proof set out in LC.§ 6-1012
or §6-2013[sic]." R. at 205.
Because of the court's decision to grant defendant's motion to reconsider and to again
exclude the testimony of Dr. DeLong and Nurse Arruda, the plaintiffs were again held to the standard
of complying with a vague and ambiguous pretrial order. The granting of EIRMC's Motion to
Reconsider simply brought this matter "full circle" and completed the cycle of applying the court's
vague and unreasonable orders, leaving the plaintiffs in the same position of being expected to

6 Because the pretrial requirement did not state that all foundational information was to be disclosed by October

30, 2013, plaintiffs were continuing their efforts to find a doctor able to confer with Dr. DeLong about the local standard
of practice. It was upon the revelation of the District Court's expectations that plaintiffs contemplated for the first time,
that an ultimate decision concerning the indeterminabilitymust be made by the extended deadline ofDecember 19, 2013.
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comply with a pretrial order which did not specify what was to be disclosed7 • Such was an abuse of
discretion and put the plaintiffs in the position that the Supreme Court in Edmunds had determined
was error.
The District Court erred in failing to consider the affidavits and affidavit testimony
presented by plaintiffs in support of their second Motion for Reconsideration and in
opposition to summary judgment. By ignoring such testimony, the District Court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.

C.

Pursuant to the court's order of January 21, 2014, the District Court permitted the plaintiffs
file "all affidavits, briefs, or other documents they wish to file in opposition to Defendants' motions
for summary judgment," and to file "all documents in support of any motion for reconsideration."
R. at 794 [Emphasis added.] The defendants were allowed 7 days after plaintiffs' filings to respond.
R. at 794. This order was in compliance with I.R.C.P. Rule 56.
Rule 56(c), directs that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."
Therefore, before a court can enter summary judgment, there must be a review of the "pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits." The District Court, however,
refused to consider the affidavits of plaintiffs' experts, Dr. DeLong and Nurse Arruda, as the same
pertained to the summary judgment. This refusal was an abuse of discretion.
Defendants' summary judgment claims depended, in the first instance, upon whether the

7

Plaintiffs believe that the District Court understood that because of the "indeterminability'' issue, there may
be some lingering objections from the defendants about the testimony of Dr. DeLong. Rather than addressing the issue
of indeterminablity, the District Court simply decided to declare its December 5, 2013 Order "a mistake." R. at 769. This
position was implied when the court determined that after the plaintiffs supplemented their expert witness disclosures
that "there remains an uncertainty as to Plaintiffs' expert witness testimony and whether it is even admissible." R. at 769.
Notwithstanding, the court has never made an admissibility determination based on the totality of the expert witness
disclosures, only on those disclosures made prior to October 30, 2013.
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Court's pretrial order requiring disclosure of expert "opinions and conclusions" could be read to be
co-extensive with the directives ofldaho Code§ §6-1012, 6-1013 and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(A)(i) so as to require disclosure at the initial disclosure date offacts showing familiarization
of the plaintiffs' experts with the local standard of health care practice and the process by which that
familiarization was accomplished. This matter has been argued extensively, above.
1.

Plaintiffs demonstrated good cause to support their second Motion for
Reconsideration, and the court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
testimony of plaintiffs' expert witnesses submitted in support of their motion.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B) permits a motion for reconsideration of any
interlocutory order ofthe trial court at any time before the entry of final judgment, or within fourteen
(14) days after the entry of the final judgment. The party making a motion for reconsideration is
permitted to present new evidence, but is not required to do so. Johnson v Lambros, 143 Idaho
468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006) [Emphasis added]. When reviewing a motion for reconsideration
under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), the district court should take into account any new facts presented by
the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co.

v First Nat'! Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) [Emphasis added]. See also
Idaho First Natl. Bank v. David Steed &Assocs., 121 Idaho 356, 361, 825 P.2d 79, 84 (1990) (trial
court should have considered affidavits submitted with motion for reconsideration); Puckett v.

Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 166, 158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007) (district court did not err in considering
affidavit filed in support of motion for reconsideration and in vacating summary judgment in a
medical malpractice action). The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention
to the new fact. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037.
The court determined that its pretrial order required a disclosure of the facts evidencing
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plaintiffs' experts' familiarity with the local standard of care and how the experts became familiar
with such standard. Summary judgment still should not have been granted. Before affording such
relief, the court should have determined whether plaintiffs' efforts and circumstances exhibited
sufficient good cause to excuse plaintiffs' alleged noncompliance with the vague and ambiguous
pretrial order. 8 Where the plaintiffs had filed both a second Motion for Reconsideration (whereby
the court must consider new evidence, including affidavits) and an opposition to summaryjudgment,
the court erred in not considering the affidavits/declarations filed by plaintiffs' experts in ruling on
the plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration and before granting summary judgment in favor
of defendants.
The affidavits and disclosures filed by the Court's December 19, 2013 extended disclosure
deadline and the updated affidavits/declarations filed in support of their second Motion for
Reconsideration, were enough to demonstrate familiarity of the plaintiffs' experts' with the requisite
standard of healthcare practice, the admissibility of the experts' opinions, and to confirm their
opinions that the defendants deviated from the standard of care in the treatment of plaintiff. This
testimony created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
2.

Plaintiffs produced admissible expert testimony in support of their second
Motion for Reconsideration and in opposition to defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case.

The affidavits and disclosures filed prior to the court revoking its December 19, 2013

8This

"good cause" was addressed in plaintiffs Memorandum in support of their January 21, 2014 motion for
reconsideration and outlined a recent diagnosis of cancer besetting the wife of plaintiffs' counsel's, and the extensive
time plaintiffs' counsel was required to be in Salt Lake City at the Huntsman Cancer Institute for her treatment. R. at
1007-1011. Although counsel acknowledges that the District Court has wide latitude in its discretion on these matters,
counsel believes such discretion should have an outer limit and that the District Court's disregard of a life threatening
diagnosis of one's immediate family member exceeds such limit. This is especially true where, as was the case here, the
scope of the disclosures the plaintiffs were being held accountable for was arguably undefined in the pretrial order.
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extended disclosure deadline, coupled with the affidavits/declarations filed in connection with the
plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration, were enough to demonstrate the plaintiffs' experts'
familiarity with the requisite standard of healthcare practice. To survive defendants' motions for
summary judgment, which were based solely on the plaintiffs' alleged failure to produce expert
testimony, plaintiffs needed to do no more than demonstrate compliance with the statutory or
common law requirements concerning the admissibility of expert testimony in a medical malpractice
action. Plaintiffs' experts' testimony met such threshold.
i.

Nurse Arruda's testimony met the foundational requirements.

During the 14 day extension allowed by the court within which plaintiffs were permitted to
supplement their expert disclosures, Nurse Arruda filed her supplemental report dated December 17,
2013 detailing her additional familiarity with the local standard of care by consultation with Susan
Dicus, a registered nurse who teaches and trains nurses atBYU-Idaho, and who also worked training
those nurses at EIRMC on the floor where Charles Lepper received treatment and care in September
2010. R. 232-233. Nurse Arruda's qualifications had already been provided as part of her initial
disclosure before October 30, 2013. R. at 162, 227.
Nurse Arruda executed an additional sworn affidavit of January 31, 2014, in support of
plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration and in response to defendants' motions for summary
judgement. R. 898-1006. Therein Nurse Arruda elaborated upon the pertinent IDAP A nursing
regulations, the NCLEX RN/NP testing standards, the interstate nursing Compact, the 2010 Idaho
Falls community standard of nursing practice as confirmed through her conversation with Susan
Dicus, and tied those standards to the actions and/or omissions of EIRMC and its nurses while
formulate her opinions that EIRMC and its nurses failed to meet the standard of healthcare practice
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in the community in September 2010.
With such extensive opinions established by affidavit testimony, plaintiffs presented
competent, admissible evidence to create, at a minimum, a genuine issue ofmaterial fact to preclude
summary judgment as sought by EIRMC. The District Court erred in disregarding Nurse Arruda's
testimony.
ii.

The local standard of care for neurosurgeons was indeterminable and
Dr. DeLong's testimony is admissible under the common law.

The District Court faulted plaintiffs for failing to raise the issue of indeterminability prior
to, or at the time of the expert witness disclosure date. Such position is illogical because at the time
expert disclosures were made, both Dr. DeLong and plaintiffs' counsel were still making concerted
efforts to locate a neurosurgeon in the Idaho Falls community or in another similar community
within the State ofldaho with whom Dr. DeLong could consult9 •
When it became apparent that the court intended to interpret its pretrial order to require full
disclosure of all foundational facts to support the admissibility of plaintiffs' experts' testimony, and
that the court had set a "hard and fast deadline" of December 19, 2013 for such disclosure, plaintiffs
recognized that their continued efforts to consult with a neurosurgeon would have to be completed
by that date even though such was earlier than the discovery cut off date. However, all Idaho
neurosurgeons declined to consult in this matter, and plaintiffs became aware that the local standard
would be indeterminable.

9

Although the court's and plaintiffs' disagreement as to the meaning of the "opinions and conclusions"
disclosure requirement in the pretrial orders is well documented, there was nothing in the pretrial order to suggest that
plaintiffs should have discontinued in their efforts to locate a local neurosurgeon willing to discuss the local standard
of care with their expert at the initial disclosure date. At that point, and until all efforts to find a willing Idaho
neurosurgeon appeared completely fruitless, plaintiffs had recognized, but had not resigned themself to the fact, that the
local standard of care may be indeterminable. This recognition was expressly brought to the court's attention in oral
argument on December 4, 2013.
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Counsel for plaintiffs contacted via letter (faxed or mailed) to every neurosurgeon in the
State ofldaho licensed to practice in September 2010 seeking the neurosurgeon's consultation in
this matter. R. at 275-597,1007-1183. The neurosurgeons either declined or did not reply. This
made clear that not a single neurosurgeon in the State of Idaho was willing to discuss the local
standard of care with Dr. DeLong, and confirmed that the local standard of practice for
neurosurgeons in Idaho Falls, and in any similar community within the State of Idaho, for the
relevant period of September 2010 was not ascertainable and therefore indeterminable.
Such conclusion was the exact determination made by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hoene
v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752,754,828 P.2d 315,317 (1992), where the court allowed the plaintiff,

relying on the common law, to present testimony from an out-of-state doctor in support ofher claim.
In Hoene the Court concluded the "local" standard was indeterminable because the defendant doctor

was one of only six doctors practicing a sub-speciality of cardiovascular surgery in the State of
Idaho, and was a co-owner with the other five cardiologists of the same sub-specialty in a
professional medical business. Id. 121 Idaho at 754, 828 P.2d at 317. Recognizing that these
cardiologists could not or would not testify against each other as to the applicable standard of care,
and there being no other similarly credentialed cardiologists in the State with whom the plaintiffs'
out-of-area expert could consult to familiarize himself with the local standard, the Idaho Supreme
Court approved of the plaintiffs' expert familiarizing himself with the local standard of health care
practice in a similar community outside the State ofldaho. The Hoene court recognized that if this
were not allowed the defendant cardiologist would have effectively immunized himself from
liability, stating:
There is no indication in LC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 that the
legislature intended to grant [an] immunity from suit to those
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physicians who have unique specialties in this state.
Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho at 756,828 P.2d at 319.

Here, the District Court attempted to distinguish Hoene by concluding that, "it is common
knowledge that multiple Idaho communities have medical providers such as Dr. Marano." R. at
1205. Plaintiffs readily acknowledge that there are multiple Idaho communities in which
neurosurgeons practice. After all, significant effort and cost was expended by plaintiffs and their
counsel to identify, locate, and contact via letter every neurosurgeon within the State of Idaho who
was practicing in September 2010.
Not a single neurosurgeon was willing to discuss this matter with plaintiffs' expert.
Therefore, the distinction relied upon by the District Court is a "distinction without a difference."
Regardless of whether there was one or one hundred similarly credentialed medical providers within
the State ofldaho, if not a single medical provider is willing to consult with plaintiffs' expert, there
is no plausible way to determine the local standard of care, and the standard thus becomes
indeterminable.
Plaintiffs do not believe this Court would countenance the notion that medical providers can
create immunity from liability simply by having all similarly credentialed medical providers in the
State decline or refuse to discuss the local standard of care with a plaintiff's expert. Notwithstanding,
such is the exact result of the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Marano.
The collective silence of neurosurgeons within the State ofldaho created immunity from all liability
for the negligent actions of a neurosurgeon; namely, Dr. Marano.
Because the plaintiffs have alleged the local standard of care for the relevant community is
indeterminable, Dr. DeLong is entitled to testify that Dr. Marano deviated from the common law
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standard of care in a "similar community." Under the common law, plaintiffs' neurosurgical expert
must only show:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

That he is a licensed neurosurgeon and was so licensed in
September 2010;
That he knows the standard of health care practice in a
community similar to or "like" Idaho Falls as that standard
existed in September 2010;
That he holds the opinion that, in treating and caring for
plaintiff Charles Lepper, Dr. Marano did not exercise that
degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of his profession in good standing
and practicing in similar localities;
That he holds the opinion Dr. Marano violated his duty to
use reasonable care and diligence in the exercise ofhis skill
and the application of his learning; and
That Dr. Marano' s violations/deviations from the applicable
standard of practice were a substantial contributing factor to
Mr. Lepper's injury.

See Hoene at 756. Dr. DeLong made this showing through his affidavit/declaration testimony. R.
at 840-897, 1284-1288.
By raising the issue ofindeterminability, and by submitting the affidavit of Dr. Schneider 10
along with the opinions and conclusions of Dr. DeLong, the plaintiffs' established a prima facie case
sufficient to survive summary judgment as against Dr. Marano. At a minimum, the issue of
indeterminability must be determined independently and prior to any conclusion on the motion for
summary judgment. The District Court erred in failing to consider Dr. DeLong's testimony and in
failing to rule on the indeterrninability issue.

IO Dr. DeLong consulted with Dr. Schneider who practiced in Billings, Montana, during the relevant time.
Billings is a similarly situated community to Idaho Falls, Idaho. At a minimum, whether Billings, Montana or any other
"community" is to be deemed "similar'' to the Idaho Falls community is a question of fact which should have precluded
summary judgment. Although the District Court seemed to misinterpret . I. C. §6-1012 and voiced concern about the use
of a community from outside ofldaho, it never ruled on this matter directly. R. at 1206.
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3.

Plaintiffs are left in a quandary as to why the court invited affidavits/briefing
in support of their second Motion for Reconsideration and in opposition of
defendants' motions for summary judgment only to have the court disregard
the affidavits and briefs.

Plaintiffs are still unclear as to why the court entered its order of January 21, 2014, inviting
plaintiffs to submit all documents in support of any motion for reconsideration and all affidavits in
opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. R. at 794. The court did not consider any
evidence/testimony of Nurse Arruda and Dr. DeLong in ruling on summary judgment or their Motion
for Reconsideration. According to the court's decision, the affidavits of Nurse Arruda and Dr.
DeLong did not "obviate the failure of the initial disclosure." R. 1206. By so concluding, the court
held that "the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts Arruda and DeLong as disclosed pursuant to the
Court's scheduling order was deficient." The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the motions for summary judgment. R. at 1208 [Emphasis added.]
If the District Court never intended to consider the additional affidavits and testimony which
it had invited, it is unclear why the court invoked the procedural safeguards and requirements of Rule
56. By doing so, the District Court again induced plaintiffs to rely to their detriment on an Order of
the court. Since the court's intention was to grant summary judgment for defendants regardless of
what affidavits plaintiffs presented, the court could have entered orders on the Motions to Dismiss
previously filed by each defendant. The District Court erred in not considering all the affidavits in
ruling on the plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and the Motions for Summary Judgment.

D.

The District Court erred in failing to consider the opinions of expert witness Elizabeth
Arruda in opposition to defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, which opinions
were based on defendant EIRMC's own internal policies and procedures produced in
the course of discovery by defendant EIRMC, after the plaintiffs' expert witness
disclosure date but before the discovery cutoff date specified by the Court in its
pretrial Order.
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Even if the District Court were correct in its decision to not consider any testimony from
Nurse Arruda subsequent to October 30, 2013 (a position adamantly disputed by plaintiffs), the
District Court could not ignore the testimony of Nurse Arruda which was based on documents
produced by defendant EIRMC within the confines of the discovery window afforded in the pretrial
order, but after the October 30, 2014 expert witness disclosure date 11 • In the course of regular
discovery, EIRMC produced a set of internal policies, procedures, and protocols for its nurses. Such
policies, procedures, and protocols presented an independent basis for Nurse Arruda's knowledge
of the local standard of care. R. at 904-905, 929-977; 1214-1216.

1.

EIRMC's internal nursing policies and procedures, disclosed after the
plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure deadline, provide an independent basis
upon which Nurse Arruda could rely to adequately familiarize herself with the
local standard of care. The court erred in failing to consider such information
as the foundational basis for Nurse Arruda's opinions and conclusions.

Pursuant to this Court's pretrial order, discovery in this matter was to be completed by
February 7, 2014, which date was independent from the parties' expert witness disclosure dates.
Through discovery, but after plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure date had passed, defendant EIRMC
produced its written policies and procedures in effect during 2010 relating to nursing assessment/
reassessment of patients, post-operative assessment of patients, reporting to a physician changes in
patient condition, nursing chain of command, and job description for EIRMC RN, LPN, and CNA
nurses. R. 929-977. These policies and procedures were first produced to plaintiffs on January 8,
2014, a month prior to the discovery cut off date, and after plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure
deadline. R. at 7.

11 This would be one of the situations specifically contemplated by I.R.C.P. Rule 26(e)(l )(B). See Edmunds
v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006).
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These policies and procedures were then provided to Nurse Arruda for her review. Within
these policies and procedures the standards of care expected of nurses at EIRMC in the Idaho Falls
community during September 2010 were sufficiently outlined. Through her review of such policies
and procedures, Nurse Arruda again confirmed that such policies established the local standard of
care, were consistent with all ofher opinions in the matter, and independently confirmed her opinion
that EIRMC's nurses violated the local standard of practice. R. 1214-1215.
Because these policies and procedures were not produced until January 2014, they were
unavailable for Nurse Arruda's review at the time of her October 2013 disclosure 12 • By taking the
position that any disclosure subsequent to October 30, 2013 was irrelevant to the opinions and
conclusions of the experts at the initial disclosure deadline, the District Court denied plaintiffs the
ability to supplement their disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(e)(l)(B). Certainly, this Court cannot
fault Nurse Arruda for being provided with information from the defendant EIRMC, within the
discovery period allowed by the court but after the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure deadline,
which independently formed the foundation for the admissibility of her testimony. Nurse Arruda's
reliance on new facts brought to light in the regular course of discovery can be used to form the
foundation for and admissibility of her testimony at the time the same were provided by defendant
EIRMC through discovery.
Nurse Arruda's familiarity with the local standard of care based on EIRMC's own internal
policies and procedures renders Nurse Arruda's testimony both relevant and admissible at trial. At
a minimum, such was enough to create a prima facie case as against defendant EIRMC. The District

12 This sequence highlights the inherent disconnection in a pretrial order which requires an expert to completely

establish the admissibility of his/her testimony at the time of disclosure while discovery continues, and where discovery
may reveal information bearing on the admissibility of the disclosed expert's testimony.
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Court erred in ignoring such testimony and in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
E.

Upon plaintiffs filing a Motion to Reconsider the District Court's Order Granting
Summary Judgment, the court was required to consider additional affidavits filed in
support of the plaintiffs' Motion.

As identified above, the Supreme Court has held that when reviewing a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), a district court should take into account any new facts
presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene
Mining Co. v First Nat'! Bank, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). Plaintiffs' experts

Nurse Arruda and Dr. DeLong again submitted afiidavit testimony in support of the plaintiffs' third
Motion to Reconsider. R. at 1212-1217, 1284-1288.
1.

Even if the court properly ignored the testimony of Nurse Arruda and Dr.
DeLong in ruling on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the court
erred in failing to consider the additional affidavits filed in support of
plaintiffs' third Motion for Reconsideration.

The Supreme Court has ruled on this issue under nearly identical circumstances in Puckett
v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 166, 158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007). In Puckett v. Verska, the plaintiff in a

medical malpractice action filed her initial expert witness disclosures and failed to list an expert to
opine about the community standard of care. Id., 144 Idaho at 164-165, P.3d at 940-941. The
defendant doctor moved to strike plaintiff's expert witnesses due to plaintiff's alleged failure to
comply with the court's pretrial order. Id., 144 Idaho at 165, P.3d at 941. In response, the plaintiff
filed supplemental expert disclosures indicating that one of the previously disclosed experts would
testify as to the standard of care. Id. The defendant doctor moved for summary judgment. Id. After
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court found that the plaintiffs' expert
"lacked the requisite familiarity with the community standard of care and granted [the doctor's]
motion for summary judgment." Id. The plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration and an
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affidavit from the same doctor the court had concluded lacked the requisite familiarity with the
community standard, but with additional information concerning the expert's intervening and
subsequent consultation with additional doctors concerning the local standard of care. Id. [Emphasis
added]. The court granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated the summary judgment,
concluding that the plaintiff's expert was "now familiar with the applicable standard of care and
was qualified to testify." Id. [Emphasis added]. The defendant doctor appealed the district court's

ruling on the motion for reconsideration and the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court
did not err in considering the affidavit in support of the motion to reconsider and in vacating the
summary judgment. Id. 144 Idaho at 166, 158 P.3d at 942.
Here, in granting both defendant EIRMC and defendant Dr. Marano' s motions for summary
judgment, the court, focusing its attention on the time of the original disclosures, acknowledged that
it did not consider the affidavits of Dr. Bradford DeLong and nurse Elizabeth Arruda filed by
plaintiffs when it granted summary judgment in favor ofEIRMC and Dr. Marano. R. at. 1208. Like
in Puckett, the defendants have alleged that plaintiffs failed to timely provide expert testimony
concerning the local standard of care in compliance with the court's pretrial order. After the
defendant in Puckett filed a motion to strike plaintiff's expert, the plaintiff filed supplemental expert
witness disclosures stating that one of the previously disclosed experts would opine concerning the
local standard of care. In this case, the court was similarly informed that the plaintiffs' experts were
in the process of obtaining the information concerning the community standard of care.
In Puckett the defendant doctor moved for summary judgment and the court determined that
the plaintiff's expert lacked the requisite familiarity with the community standard of care even with
the supplemental disclosure. Here, defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that

35-APPELLANTS'BRIEF

plaintiffs' experts lacked familiarity with the local standard of care and therefore were unable to set
forth a prima facie case. The only slight difference between this case and Puckett is that while the
court in Puckett determined after considering all the evidence presented by the plaintiff, that the
plaintiff's expert had still failed to establish his familiarity with the community standard. The court
in this matter has chosen to not consider any evidence or testimony from plaintiffs' experts
presented after October 2013 stating that, "subsequent disclosures or testimony by affidavit should

not be considered" even though the Court expressly invited submission of the affidavits to oppose
summary judgment. R. at 1208 [Emphasis added].
The net result was the same in both cases; summary judgment was entered in favor of the
defendants. Undeterred, the plaintiff and expert in Puckett continued their efforts to locate medical
doctors with whom the expert could discuss and rely on to familiarize himself with the standard of
care. Finding success, the plaintiffin Puckett filed a motion for reconsideration with another affidavit
from the same, previously disclosed expert who had already been adjudicated unfamiliar with the
local standard of care, outlining intervening conversations by which he had successfully familiarized
himself with the applicable local standard of care. After revelation of the expert's new familiarity
with the community standard, and upon the recognition that the expert was "now familiar with the

applicable standard of care and was qualified to testify" the court in Puckett vacated the
summary judgment and the case proceeded on its merits. Puckett, 144 Idaho at 166, 158 P .3d at 942.
In this case, additional testimony from the plaintiffs' previously disclosed experts was
submitted to the court subsequent to October 30, 2013 and in support of various Motions for
Reconsideration. This additional testimony provided the foundational basis upon which the
plaintiffs' experts' testimony was admissible. In fact, the District Court seemed to acknowledge that
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at the time of the Motion for Reconsideration that expert Arruda had complied with the foundational
requirements ofidaho Code when it concluded, "that Arruda may now have an opinion on the local
standard of care does not remedy the initial failure in not disclosing her testimony with the required
element of the local standard of care" at the time of the initial disclosures. R. at1205 [Emphasis in
original.] However, had the court properly considered the additional declarations and affidavits from
plaintiffs' experts, as it should when considering a Motion for Reconsideration, there was sufficient
evidence for the court to grant plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, set aside the order granting each
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and to proceed to trial on the merits of the claim.

2.

The District Court erred and abused its discretion in failing to rule on the
substance of plaintiffs' final Motion to Reconsider and finding the Motion
inapplicable because of the entry of a final judgment.

According to I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B), "a motion for reconsideration ofany interlocutory orders
of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than

fourteen (14) days after the entry of a fmaljudgment." [Emphasis added.] The position advocated
by both defendants, that plaintiffs' motion was untimely, requires an interpretation of this Rule
which would render the above-emphasized portion of the Rule a complete nullity.
The Supreme Court ofldaho recently addressed the exact timing issue present in this case.
In Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207, 268 P .3d 1159 (2012) the district court had
granted summary judgment in favor of the county in a property/public right-of-way dispute. Seven
(7) days after granting summary judgment, the District Court entered its Final Judgment. Five (5)
days after entering the Final Judgment, the court entered a Judgment of Dismissal. Two (2) days after
entry of the court's Judgment of Dismissal and seven (7) days after entry of the Final Judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Order Granting Summary Judgment and filed an affidavit
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from a new witness for the court to consider. On reconsideration the District Court properly
recognized that it had to consider the new affidavit under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho confirmed that the District Court was required to
consider the affidavit under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B), notwithstanding the entry of a final judgment before
the plaintiffs had filed their Motion to Reconsider. According to the Supreme Court,
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) permits parties to move
the court to reconsider an interlocutory order until fourteen days
after f"mal judgment has been entered. The court must consider
new evidence bearing on the correctness of a summary judgment
order if the motion to reconsider is filed within fourteen days
after a final judgment issues. See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v.
Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184 (2009); see also
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N Idaho, 118
Idaho 812, 822, 800 P.2d 1026, 1036 (1990) (stating that a party
could have brought a deposition to the court's attention after a
summary judgment hearing under I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B)). Appellants
filed their Motion to Reconsider on March 31, 2010, two days
after the f"maljudgment was issued. It was therefore timely and
properly before the court.

Id., 152 Idaho at 210,268 P.3d at 1162 [Emphasis added].
The Kepler-Fleenor decision makes abundantly clear that the intent of Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) is
to allow a party up to fourteen days after a final judgment is issued to bring a Motion for
Reconsideration of an interlocutory order. This interpretation not only gives meaning to the full
language of Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), it also illustrates that a party's right to request reconsideration of an
interlocutory order cannot be eliminated if a final judgment is entered immediately following entry
of an interlocutory order.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This appeal turns on whether the District Court erred in excluding plaintiffs' expert
witnesses for allegedly failing to comply with the court's initial pretrial order which did not specify
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the scope of expert disclosures required. The District Court further erred in refusing to acknowledge
the affidavit testimony of plaintiffs' experts filed in support of timely motions for reconsideration
and opposing summary judgment.
The plaintiffs assert that this case is analogous to both Edmunds v. Kramer, 142 Idaho 867,
136 P.3d 338 (2006) and Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007). Had the District
Court followed the guidance in Edmunds and adhered to the expanded time deadline it initially
extended to plaintiffs, this case could have moved forward on its merits, and not been derailed by
procedural discrepancies. Just like in Edmunds, the plaintiffs in this case were not on notice as to the
court's expectation that the scope of the expert disclosures required disclosure of more than
"opinions and conclusions." Once such notice was given, plaintiffs were prepared to, and in fact did,
respond with appropriate disclosures. Unfortunately, the court rescinded the extension of time and
maintained its position that plaintiffs should have divined the court's intent from the language of the
pretrial order that foundational facts were to be disclosed as part of the "opinions and conclusions."
Even with the court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' experts failed to demonstrate a
knowledge of the local standard of care at the initial expert witness disclosure deadline, the court was
not prevented from considering Nurse Arruda and Dr. DeLong's affidavit testimony on
reconsideration. These affidavits demonstrated that, despite any alleged failure in October 2013, both
Nurse Arruda and Dr. DeLong possessed the proper foundation of their opinions and that their
respective testimony would be admissible at trial under statute and the common law. On
reconsideration, as in Puckett, this Court must recognize that Nurse Arruda and Dr. DeLong were
qualified to testify, even though the District Court previously ruled they were not. Plaintiffs
presented experts qualified to testify, established a prima facie case, and the District Court erred in
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not granting the plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and in refusing to set aside the order granting
summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23 rd day of July, 2014.
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